thankyou for this!<br><br>I've been quietly fuming over the "is it a facebook or a twitter revolution" question!<br><br><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sun, Jan 30, 2011 at 11:32 AM, Ulises Mejias <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:ulises.mejias@oswego.edu">ulises.mejias@oswego.edu</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">[for citation hyperlinks and images, go to<br>
<a href="http://blog.ulisesmejias.com/2011/01/30/the-twitter-revolution-must-die/" target="_blank">http://blog.ulisesmejias.com/2011/01/30/the-twitter-revolution-must-die/</a>]<br>
<br>
<br>
THE TWITTER REVOLUTION MUST DIE<br>
<br>
Have you ever heard of the Leica Revolution? No?<br>
<br>
That’s probably because folks who don’t know anything about “branding”<br>
insist on calling it the<br>
Mexican Revolution. An estimated two million people died in the long<br>
struggle (1910-1920) to<br>
overthrow a despotic government and bring about reform. But why<br>
shouldn’t we re-name the<br>
revolution not after a nation or its people, but after the “social<br>
media” that had such a great<br>
impact in making the struggle known all over the world: the<br>
photographic camera? Even<br>
better, let’s name the revolution not after the medium itself, but<br>
after the manufacturer of the<br>
cameras that were carried by people like Hugo Brehme to document the<br>
atrocities of war. Viva<br>
Leica, cabrones!<br>
<br>
My sarcasm is, of course, a thinly veiled attempt to point out how<br>
absurd it is to refer to events<br>
in Iran, Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere as the Twitter Revolution, the<br>
Facebook Revolution, and<br>
so on. What we call things, the names we use to identify them, has<br>
incredible symbolic power,<br>
and I, for one, refuse to associate corporate brands with struggles<br>
for human dignity. I agree<br>
with Jillian York when she says:<br>
<br>
“… I am glad that Tunisians were able to utilize social media to bring<br>
attention to their plight.<br>
But I will not dishonor the memory of Mohamed Bouazizi–or the 65<br>
others that died on the<br>
streets for their cause–by dubbing this anything but a human revolution.”<br>
<br>
Granted, as Joss Hands points out, there appears to be more skepticism<br>
than support for the<br>
idea that tools like YouTube, Twitter and Facebook are primarily<br>
responsible for igniting the<br>
uprisings in question. But that hasn’t stopped the internet<br>
intelligentsia from engaging in<br>
lengthy arguments about the role that technology is playing in these<br>
historic developments.<br>
One camp, comprised of people like Clay Shirky, seem to make<br>
allowances for what Cory<br>
Doctorow calls the “internet’s special power to connect and liberate.”<br>
On the other side,<br>
authors like Ethan Zuckerman, Malcolm Gladwell and Evgeny Morozov have<br>
proposed that<br>
while digital media can play a role in organizing social movements, it<br>
cannot be counted on to<br>
build lasting alliances, or even protect net activists once<br>
authorities start using the same tools<br>
to crack down on dissent.<br>
<br>
Both sides are, perhaps, engaging in a bit of technological<br>
determinism–one by embellishing<br>
the agency of technology, the other by diminishing it. The truth, as<br>
always, is somewhere in<br>
between, and philosophers of technology settled the dispute of whether<br>
technology shapes<br>
society (technological determinism) or society shapes technology<br>
(cultural materialism) a while<br>
ago: the fact is that technology and society mutually and continually<br>
determine each other.<br>
<br>
So why does the image of a revolution enabled by social media continue<br>
to grab headlines<br>
and spark the interest of Western audiences, and what are the dangers<br>
of employing such<br>
imagery? My fear is that the hype about a Twitter/Facebook/YouTube<br>
revolution performs two<br>
functions: first, it depoliticizes our understanding of the conflicts,<br>
and second, it whitewashes<br>
the role of capitalism in suppressing democracy.<br>
<br>
To elaborate, the discourse of a social media revolution is a form of<br>
self-focused empathy in<br>
which we imagine the other (in this case, a Muslim other) to be<br>
nothing more than a projection<br>
of our own desires, a depoliticized instant in our own becoming. What<br>
a strong affirmation of<br>
ourselves it is to believe that people engaged in a desperate struggle<br>
for human dignity are<br>
using the same Web 2.0 products we are using! That we are able to form<br>
this empathy largely<br>
on the basis of consumerism demonstrates the extent to which we have<br>
bought into the notion<br>
that democracy is a by-product of media products for self-expression,<br>
and that the<br>
corporations that create such media products would never side with<br>
governments against their<br>
own people.<br>
<br>
It is time to abandon this fantasy, and to realize that although the<br>
internet’s original<br>
architecture encouraged openness, it is becoming increasingly<br>
privatized and centralized.<br>
While it is true that an internet controlled by a handful of media<br>
conglomerates can still be<br>
used to promote democracy (as people are doing in Tunisia, Egypt, and<br>
all over the world), we<br>
need to reconsider the role that social media corporations like<br>
Facebook and Twitter will play<br>
in these struggles.<br>
<br>
The clearest way to understand this role is to simply look at the past<br>
and current role that<br>
corporations have played in “facilitating” democracy elsewhere.<br>
Consider the above image of<br>
the tear gas canister “fired against egyptians demanding democracy.”<br>
The can is labeled<br>
Made in U.S.A.<br>
<br>
But surely it would be a gross calumny to suggest that ICT are on the<br>
same level as tear gas,<br>
right? Well, perhaps not. Today, our exports encompass not only<br>
weapons of war and riot<br>
control used to keep in power corrupt leaders, but tools of internet<br>
surveillance like<br>
Narusinsight, produced by a subsidiary of Boeing and used by the<br>
Egyptian government to<br>
track down and “disappear” dissidents.<br>
<br>
Even without citing examples of specific Web companies that have aided<br>
governments in the<br>
surveillance and persecution of their citizens (Jillian York documents<br>
some of these<br>
examples), my point is simply that the emerging market structure of<br>
the internet is threatening<br>
its potential to be used by people as a tool for democracy. The more<br>
monopolies (a market<br>
structure characterized by a single seller) control access and<br>
infrastructure, and the more<br>
monopsonies (a market structure characterized by a single buyer)<br>
control aggregation and<br>
distribution of user-generated content, the easier it is going to be<br>
for authorities to pull the<br>
plug, as just happened in Egypt.<br>
<br>
I’m reminded of the first so-called Internet Revolution. Almost a<br>
hundred years after the<br>
original Mexican Revolution, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation<br>
launched an uprising in<br>
southern Mexico to try to address some of the injustices that the<br>
first revolution didn’t fix, and<br>
that remain unsolved to this day. But back in 1994, Subcomandante<br>
Marcos and the rest of<br>
the EZLN didn’t have Facebook profiles, or use Twitter to communicate<br>
or organize. Maybe<br>
their movement would have been more effective if they had. Or maybe it<br>
managed to stay<br>
alive because of the decentralized nature of the networks the EZLN and<br>
their supporters used.<br>
<br>
My point is this: as digital networks grow and become more centralized<br>
and privatized, they<br>
increase opportunities for participation, but they also increase<br>
inequality, and make it easier<br>
for authorities to control them.<br>
<br>
Thus, the real challenge is going to be figuring out how to continue<br>
the struggle after the<br>
network has been shut off. In fact, the struggle is going to be<br>
against those who own and<br>
control the network. If the fight can’t continue without Facebook and<br>
Twitter, then it is doomed.<br>
But I suspect the people of Iran, Tunisia and Egypt (unlike us)<br>
already know this, out of sheer<br>
necessity.<br>
<br>
[Ulises A. Mejias is assistant professor at the State University of<br>
New York, College at<br>
Oswego. His book, The Limits of Nodes: Unmapping the Digital Network,<br>
is under review by<br>
publishers.]<br>
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</blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><br>-- <br>Radhika Gajjala<br>Director, American Culture Studies<br>Professor of Communication Studies and Cultural Studies<br>101 East Hall<br>Bowling Green State University<br>Bowling Green, OH 43403<br>
<br><a href="http://personal.bgsu.edu/%7Eradhik" target="_blank">http://personal.bgsu.edu/~radhik</a><br><br><span>"I am not young enough to know everything.</span>"<br>
<span>
<a href="http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/o/oscarwilde103675.html" target="_blank">Oscar
Wilde</a>
</span>
<br>
<br><br>